Wednesday, March 21, 2012

US States Get Corruption Risk Score Card



By Caitlin Ginley
The tales are sadly familiar to even the most casual observer of state politics.
In Georgia, more than 650 government employees accepted gifts from vendors doing business with the state in 2007 and 2008, clearly violating state ethics law. The last time the state issued a penalty on a vendor was 1999.
North Carolina legislator sponsored and voted on a bill to loosen regulations on billboard construction, even though he co-owned five billboards in the state. When the ethics commission reviewed the case, it found no conflict; after all, the panel reasoned, the legislation would benefit all billboard owners in the state – not just the lawmaker who pushed for the bill.
Tennessee established its ethics commission six years ago, but has yet to issue a single ethics penalty. It’s almost impossible to know whether the oversight is effectively working, because complaints are not made available to the public.
West Virginia governor borrowed a car from his local dealership to take it for a “test drive.” He kept the car for four years, during which the dealership won millions in state contracts. 
When representatives of a biotech company took Montana legislators out to dinner, they neither registered as lobbyists nor reported the fact that they picked up the bill. They didn’t have to – the law only requires registration upon spending $2,400 during a legislative session.  And in Maine, one state senator did not disclose $98 million in state contracts that went to an organization for which he served as executive director. The lack of disclosure was not an oversight; due to a loophole in state law, he was under no obligation to do so.
The stories go on and on. Open records laws with hundreds of exemptions.  Crucial budgeting decisions made behind closed doors by a handful of power brokers. “Citizen” lawmakers voting on bills that would benefit them directly. Scores of legislators turning into lobbyists seemingly overnight. Disclosure laws without much disclosure. Ethics panels that haven’t met in years. 
State officials make lofty promises when it comes to ethics in government. They tout the transparency of legislative processes, accessibility of records, and the openness of public meetings. But these efforts often fall short of providing any real transparency or legitimate hope of rooting out corruption. 
That’s the depressing bottom line that emerges from the State Integrity Investigation, a first-of-its-kind, data-driven assessment of transparency, accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms in all 50 states. Not a single state — not one — earned an A grade from the months-long probe.  Only five states earned  a B grade: New JerseyConnecticutWashingtonCalifornia, and Nebraska. Nineteen states got C’s and 18 received D’s. Eight states earned failing grades of 59 or below from the project, which is a collaboration of the Center for Public IntegrityGlobal Integrity, and Public Radio International
What’s behind the dismal grades? Across the board, state ethics, open records and disclosure laws lack one key feature: teeth. 
“It’s a terrible problem,” said Tim Potts, executive director of the nonprofit advocacy group Democracy Rising PA, which works to inspire citizen trust in government.  “A good law isn’t worth anything if it’s not enforced.”
Some of the results of the State Integrity Investigation seem more than a little counterintuitive.  New Jersey emerges at the top of the pack, a seemingly stunning ranking for a state with a reputation for dirty politics. And there are other surprises: Illinois, hardly a beacon of clean governmental in recent years, comes in at a respectable number 10. Louisiana ranks 15th.
Many of the states at the bottom of the rankings, meanwhile, are sparsely-populated Western or Plains states like Idaho (40th), Wyoming (48th) and the Dakotas (North Dakota is number 43 and South Dakotacomes in at 49).  There, libertarianism roots, a small-town, neighborly approach to government and the honest belief that “everybody knows everybody” has overridden any perceived need for strong protections in law.
Peggy Kerns, director of the Center for Ethics in Government at the National Conference of State Legislatures, noted that ethics laws are shaped by the environment and culture of the state. “In smaller states, the culture is different,” she said. “It is harder to disobey the law and go against your own moral core if everyone knows you.”
And statehouses with a history of political corruption and scandal – like New JerseyIllinois, andLouisiana – have been more likely in recent years to
New Jersey State House
“Legislators will react to a corruption scandal, and work to get political cover by enacting reform,” said Karen Hobert Flynn, vice president for state operations at the nonprofit advocacy group Common Cause.
That’s apparently the case in New Jersey, where a series of scandals helped bring about some of the strongest ethics laws in the country. According to the State Integrity Investigation, New Jersey’s strong points are clear: extensive financial disclosure requirements for the governor, a transparently-run pension fund, and an aggressive ethics enforcement agency. The state also boasts some of the nation’s toughest anti-pay-to-play laws for contractors. 
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, in an attempt to shed the state of its scandalous political history, enacted sweeping ethics reform legislation as one of his first acts in office back in 2008. Among the new laws: financial disclosure requirements for nearly every public official and caps on how much lobbyists can spend on meals and drinks.
States have taken the initiative on other fronts as well. Connecticut implemented a public financing system for elections. Alabama granted subpoena power to its state ethics commission. South Dakota unveiled an online database for campaign finance records. Florida bans all gifts from lobbyists to lawmakers. Citizens in Washington have easy online access to government records and data, including the final map on the state’s Redistricting Commission website (which also lists past meeting minutes, draft plans, and public commentary).    
But advocates note that substantial reform efforts are more often the exception rather than the rule. And typically, even new laws often fall short of their goals. Hobert Flynn said she is often “disappointed by how far-reaching the reforms are, how the reforms are implemented, and how they are enforced.”
Measuring the states: The Integrity Index
There are many ways to gauge government integrity. By one recent measure, Chicago ranks as the most corrupt city in the nation. New York places first as the most corrupt state.
Those are the findings of a February report released by the University of Illinois’ Institute of Government and Public Affairs, based on public corruption conviction data from the Department of Justice. New York had a grand total of 2,522 federal public corruption convictions from 1976 to 2010, followed closely by California (2,345 convictions) and Illinois (1,828).
But some argue that using convictions as an indicator of which states are “most corrupt” is misleading.  A hefty number of prosecutions may actually suggest the system is working – corrupt behavior is rooted out and perpetrators are punished. States with relatively low numbers of convictions are not necessarily more accountable, but perhaps less equipped to sniff out malfeasance and go after the bad guys. So the State Integrity Investigation takes a different approach by measuring the risks of corruption, as reflected in the strength or weakness of laws, policies, and procedures designed to assure transparency and accountability in state government. 
Using a combination of on-the-ground investigative reporting and original data collection and analysis, the State Integrity Index researched 330 “Integrity Indicators” across 14 categories of state government: public access to information, political financing, executive accountability, legislative accountability, judicial accountability, state budget processes, civil service management, procurement, internal auditing, lobbying disclosure, pension fund management, ethics enforcement, insurance commissions, and redistricting.
Indicators assess what laws, if any, are on the books (“in law” indicator) and whether the laws are effective in practice (“in practice” indicators). In many states, the disconnect between scores on a state’s law and scores in practice suggest a serious “enforcement gap.”
In other words, the laws are there, just not always followed. 
 ‘Hiding in plain sight’
There have been nods toward transparency almost everywhere. In this era of online, immediately accessible information, some government records are easier to retrieve than ever. Bill language is posted on websites. Top officials disclose personal financial interests. State candidates reveal donors. States devote entire websites to budget expenditures, allowing taxpayers to track government spending
There remain a few holdouts. IdahoVermont, and Michigan still have no financial disclosure requirements for lawmakers and
Maryland State House
executive branch officials. Maryland is the only state in the country that requires an in-person visit to the state capitol to request and view financial disclosure information. 
Ed Bender, executive director of the National Institute on Money in State Politics, said that governments may seem transparent by making information available, but it is not always presented in a useable or digestible format. He said trying to compare data within a state – say, linking campaign donations to state contracts – can be nearly impossible, and is a huge barrier to transparency. 
“It’s disingenuous, hiding in plain sight,” Bender said. “Governments say, ‘here it is,’ but they don’t tell the story.” 
Maryland unveiled a series of data-centric government performance measurement and spending websites – like StateStat to track spending of stimulus funds – which Governor Martin O’Malley hailed as the “foundation for restoring accountability and for driving our progress.” But the state’s poor ranking on public access to information – it came in 46th – would suggest otherwise.
 “They’re selective on what they share, how they share it, and who they share it with,” said Greg Smith of the nonprofit group Community Research, who said poring through the state’s spending databases can be a headache.
“You can only look at it particle by particle, atom by atom,” he said. When he requests entire databases from state agencies, they refuse, citing a lack of technological expertise to properly export the data.  
In every state, citizens have the basic right to access government records. But nearly every law is riddled with holes. Vermont’s Public Records Act boasts more than 260 exemptions, one of which almost always seems to apply to a request for information. Virginia’s law excludes the State Corporation Commission, a regulatory agency that oversees all businesses, utilities, financial institutions, and railroads in the state. Louisiana includes an exemption for records that are part of the “deliberative process” in the governor’s office, which could mean anything from budget negotiations to communications between the governor and his staff. Wyoming lawmakers excluded themselves from the state’s open records policy to prevent citizens from having access to the early bill-writing process. In effect, draft legislation and all related documents are withheld from the public.
In Massachusetts, the barriers to access are especially daunting. Not only are the legislature, governor, and courts exempt from public records law, but legislative votes are not even recorded in committee.
Lax enforcement, zero oversight
Across the board, enforcement is weak. States rarely check the accuracy of campaign finance records or asset disclosures unless prompted by a complaint. Penalties are insignificant or never issued. Violators of the law suffer little more than a slap on the wrist. 
Arizona legislators admitted to violating the state’s financial disclosure policy when they failed to report trips paid for by the Fiesta Bowl. Neither the Senate nor House Ethics committee followed with an investigation.
New York’s Board of Elections oversees campaign finance, but can only fine violators $500 for missing filing deadlines. At one point, Senator Pedro Espada owed the state about $13,000 in fines for misfiling records (while also sitting on about $60,000 in fines from the New York City Campaign Finance Board).
Earlier this year, a North Carolina judge ruled that the Secretary of State could not impose a $30,000 fine on a lobbyist who failed to register. The judge cited ambiguous language in the law and decided the Secretary did not have the proper authority.
Forty-one states have an agency tasked with overseeing ethics laws in the state. But many of these agencies are crippled by shortages:  inadequate funding, tiny staffs, and limited powers. Delaware’s two-person Public Integrity Commission can hardly keep up with enforcing rules for about 48,000 government employees. In South Carolina, the State Ethics Commission’s budget has been slashed six times in the past three years. When legislators in Alaska leave required information off their financial disclosure forms, the Alaska Public Offices Commission simply does not have the capacity to track down the missing details.
“There’s an inability to enforce the laws on the books,” said Hobert Flynn of Common Cause. “It creates a real crisis and the illusion of strong laws in place.”
In Pennsylvania, said Potts of Democracy Rising PA, the amount of money allocated for enforcement of ethics rules is considered “budget dust.” Governor Tom Corbett cut funding to the state’s ethics commission by five percent in his most recent budget plan, even though the state sits on a surplus that Potts said could “fund all public integrity enforcement for a decade.”
And in states where the financial outlook is still grim, watchdog agencies are often among the first to get cut, consolidated or eliminated entirely. In Connecticut, nine independent agencies were moved under one umbrella organization, the Office of Governmental
Georgia State Capitol
Accountability. Advocates claim the move saves money and improves efficiency, but critics point to a massive reduction in staff and loss of enforcement power – the agency will likely audit only 10 lobbyists this year, compared with 40 lobbyists the year before. 
While there are many examples that highlight a lack of resources, others assert that political factors may also be at play.
Georgia’s legislature slashed the ethics commission’s budget, eliminating all investigative positions and eventually forcing out its two top staffers. The former executive director claimed the funding cuts came with ulterior motives; at the time, the agency was pursuing an investigation against Governor Nathan Deal for improper use of campaign funds and exceeding campaign finance limits. Deal said the cuts were in line with what happened to other agencies. The state’s inspector general followed with an investigation, but found no evidence to support the claim of the commission’s former executive director.
Political loyalties can be a potential problem, especially since many ethics agencies are staffed by gubernatorial or legislative appointments.
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo revamped the state’s ethics agency as part of a comprehensive overhaul of state ethics laws. But he stocked the newly-formed Joint Commission on Public Ethics with political allies, including a fundraiser for his reelection campaign and a former staffer. Most recently, hetapped Inspector General Ellen Biben to be the commission’s executive director. Biben, though widely respected in government circles, also served as Cuomo’s deputy in the attorney general’s office, prompting some New Yorkers to question her independence from the administration.
Members of the Alaska Personnel Board are appointed by the same entity they are charged with overseeing – the governor’s office. The Texas Ethics Commission is comprised of appointees by the governor and legislature, which not only presents an inherent conflict but often leads to gridlock. Commissioners are typically split along party lines, but in order to pursue an investigation, at least six of the eight commissioners must agree.
Conflict? What conflict?
Without effective oversight by an independent agency, states frequently rely on a system of self-reporting. The onus falls on public officials to decide for themselves whether their decision-making ability has been compromised. In some cases, the language of the law allows for exceptions; Montana requires legislators to disclose a conflict only if they stand to gain a “direct and personal impact” from the relationship. Often consequences are modest or nonexistent.  In Illinois, a legislator should avoid a “substantial threat to his independence of judgment” – but if that line is crossed, there is no penalty.
Kerns of NCSL said it is difficult to implement strong conflict of interest laws, especially for citizen legislatures in which lawmakers almost always hold outside jobs. She doesn’t see anything inherently wrong with that – their background and expertise can be helpful for making policy decisions – unless the lawmaker stands to gain financially from the decision.    
“That defies logic,” she said. “People should have better sense.”
Michigan’s conflict of interest laws are largely undefined, so recusal is rare. In 2011, Senate Democrats challenged the notion that lawmakers with a financial interest in limited liability corporations could vote on a tax reform plan. The lieutenant governor ruled that it was up to the lawmakers to decide for themselves if they had a conflict, and no one abstained.
Hawaii representative, also working as a lobbyist for the American Chemistry Council, was allowed to vote on a bill that would implement a 10-cent fee for plastic bags. The House Speaker defended the decision: "Just because he represents that company does not mean he cannot vote up or down on the measure.”
For state judges, it’s a similar situation. Nearly all states have rules, codes, or regulations outlining recusal requirements, but again they leave it up to the judges to decide their own impartiality.
“There’s a longstanding principal that no judge should be the judge in his or her own case,” said Charlie Hall, director of communications for Justice at Stake, a national organization that promotes a fair and impartial court system. “There’s a strong sense by many that if one party asks a judge to step aside, there’s something not satisfying by the judge saying, ‘I think I can be impartial. I can make the decision.’”
Nine states don’t require judges to disclose outside assets, making it almost impossible to determine if a judge has a conflict at all.  And in states where judges run for election, the potential for conflicts to arise is even greater.
“Special interests have discovered judicial elections and the money is pouring in,” Hall said.
Spending on judicial elections more than doubled in the past 20 years. From 2000 to 2009, special interests funneled about $206 million into court elections, up from about $83 million in the previous decade.
Hall said many states are moving forward, albeit slowly, to develop more transparent processes for judicial recusal.  But in at least one state – Wisconsin – the courts took what some believe to be a huge step backwards. In 2010, the state Supreme Court ruled that judges need not recuse themselves from cases involving their own campaign donors.
The devil’s in the details: where the loopholes are
Even the strictest of rules has unforeseen consequences. And when it comes to money, influence, and power in state government, interest groups and big-money donors will find ways around just about any limit.
In South Carolina, corporations and individuals can donate only $1,000 to local House and Senate races or $3,500 to statewide seats. But multi-millionaire Howard Rich skirted the limits by funneling contributions through separate LLCs. He also made the contributions during a “blackout period” – two weeks right before the election when candidates can hold off making donations public until after the election. 
Illinois, which passed campaign finance limits for the first time in 2009, places no restrictions on donations by a corporation’s affiliates. So although a corporation is restricted by a $10,000 limit on donations to individual candidates, it can easily multiply that amount through individually  incorporated entities.
New York donors can also give freely to “housekeeping accounts,” ostensibly reserved for political party headquarters, staff, and events not affiliated with a particular candidate. Big-time donors, corporations, and trade organizations have donated $11 million to these accounts in the past two years.
Gift bans seek to prevent lobbyists from wining-and-dining legislators to influence policy. Some states, like Missouri, place no restrictions on dollar amounts of gifts, as long as all gifts are disclosed. Other states have much more stringent rules, like in Florida, where lobbyists are banned from buying lawmakers even a cup of coffee.
But even when the laws have been retooled and seem airtight, lobbyists find ways around them. InOregon, where the gift laws were reformed in 2007 and again in 2009, the language of the law has become so specific in noting exemptions that it’s easy to skirt: entertainment excursions can technically be billed as “fact-finding” missions, for example, which is acceptable under the law. In 2006 North Carolina passed a ban on lobbyists buying meals for individual legislators. So instead, lobbyists bankroll receptions for groups of lawmakers. Florida has a strict ban on lobbyist gift giving, but the state’s definition of lobbyist allows for gaps – not everyone who lobbies is considered a lobbyist under the law – and much of the spending can go unreported.
The lobbyist-lawmaker relationship is a close one in many states, where part-time legislators who meet for short sessions often rely on outside expertise to guide their policy decisions. Those relationships become even stronger when ex-legislators move almost immediately into the private sector, exerting influence over their former colleagues. “Cooling off” periods – the length of time between when a legislator leaves office and when he can register as a lobbyist – aim to diffuse those relationships.
But in some states, there’s no such waiting time. In Idaho, a former legislator, after losing her reelection campaign, was quickly hired as the lobbyist for a property developer – a move not only accepted, but recommended by the House Speaker.
The same holds true in Nebraska, where at least 16 former lawmakers are now registered lobbyists. There, as in other states, term limits push lawmakers out into the private sector, so it is not unusual for former legislators to represent special interests like Big Tobacco and health insurance companies.
Closed to the public
California Assembly chamber
California faced a $23 billion budget shortfall in 2011. The state opens up the budgeting process to the public – but only to a point. Citizens can participate in forums and meetings leading up to final budget negotiations, when the “Big Five” (the governor and four legislative leaders) take the discussion behind closed doors to finalize the bill.
Such is a common practice in many states, where open meetings and public testimony occur, but usually for the sake of appearance only. The real decisions are made when no one is looking.
According to the Index, California ranks near the bottom on budget transparency, losing points for citizen access to budget expenditures and public input at hearings.
New York, which faced a shortfall of $8.5 billion, falls a few places below California. Again, the public can view budget documents and comment at hearings on the front end, but the final bill is quickly pushed through, giving citizens little opportunity to react. The final budget often includes a few surprising compromises that were made behind closed doors. 
Redistricting, a notoriously opaque and politically-tainted process in many states, is actually where California stood out. It received top marks for redistricting transparency, due largely to its new Citizens Redistricting Commission that gave power to a randomly-selected group of Californians instead of the legislature.  
In other states, though, the redistricting process largely remains a mystery to constituents. Although the redrawing of district lines directly impacts voters and communities, the public is usually left out of the process. In a worst case scenario, maps are redrawn by the very legislators who are seeking reelection, allowing them to ensure the new district lines fall in their favor.
Many states are finding ways to include, or at least educate, the public on this process by holding meetings, making census data available online, or encouraging citizens to submit their own maps. But even if the state goes through those motions, it does not guarantee the public commentary will be taken into account in the final map. 
Other states don’t even try. During the 2011 redistricting session in Wisconsin, Republican legislators unveiled map proposals, held one public hearing, and passed their plan in two weeks. In Oklahoma, meetings were held within days of census data being released, giving the public no real chance to provide strong input.
“The government belongs to the people,” said Common Cause’s Hobert Flynn. “They should have full access to the process and how decisions are made.”
It’s a noble goal, to be sure. But as the State Integrity Investigation reveals, it is one that’s rarely met.

Monday, March 19, 2012

UK fraud conviction highlights Nigeria's deficient enforcement measures



March 19 2012

Since the 1999 Constitution came into effect, few people have been convicted on charges of political corruption or financial misconduct in Nigeria. This is not because Nigeria has no white collar crime, but rather because the level and efficacy of enforcement leave a great deal to be desired. Only one person has been convicted of a crime following a trial, while a few convictions have followed upon guilty pleas (as the product of plea arrangements). These convictions have resulted in extremely light sentences. One former state governor received the option of a six-month prison sentence or a fine of approximately $25,000 (he opted for the fine and paid it on the spot); a former bank chief executive, convicted (on a plea arrangement) of defrauding the bank of several million dollars, served a six-month prison sentence in a private hospital and was ordered to forfeit assets valued in excess of $1.3 billion. The trials of other bank officials charged at the same time continue to plod through the Nigerian judicial system some four years later.
The most recent such conviction is that of James Ibori, former governor of Delta State, by an English court in February. His conviction was the culmination of a series of fraud and money-laundering charges brought against him in the United Kingdom. Ibori's wife, mistress, sister and UK solicitor were all convicted in 2010 and 2011 and are presently serving prison terms ranging from five to seven years for their involvement in his crimes.
While the UK authorities were prosecuting Ibori and his accomplices, the Nigerian authorities appeared to have been doing very little. The little that was attempted ended in failure. After Ibori was charged with fraud and money laundering by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), its then-chairman was dismissed by the late President Umaru Yar'Adua and replaced by a retired police officer who was herself dismissed by current President Jonathan Goodluck and replaced by the EFCC's first director of operations (who had been forced out of the EFCC when its first chairman was dismissed).
The charges brought against Ibori, which were the catalyst for the removal of the EFCC's first chairman, were eventually dismissed on a technical objection. The EFCC, under new leadership, appeared to have been content with the decision and made no great effort to have it overturned on appeal (a position that has since changed with the appointment of its third chairman). For reasons that are still unclear, the EFCC's stance towards Ibori changed and an effort was later made to take him into custody. How serious this attempt was is open to question. Ibori knew in advance of the impending arrest and the officers sent to arrest him were thwarted by what was, in effect, his private army. He then disappeared from Nigeria, re-emerging in Dubai. There he was arrested on a UK warrant and later extradited to the United Kingdom, where he has now been convicted on the money-laundering and fraud charges. His sentencing is scheduled to take place on April 16 2012.
Ibori's case is just one of a number of instances in which fraud committed in Africa has resulted in convictions outside Africa. These instances add justification to the perception that in Nigeria (as in a number of other African countries), the authorities are – for whatever reason – content to leave fraud and corruption prosecution to other jurisdictions. However, the failure of some African authorities to take action is not always a result of negative motives. The authorities may simply lack the resources needed to proceed against the perpetrators of fraud.

Monday, March 12, 2012

White Collar Crime - Germany : Sponsorship and bribery in tri-party relationships

Contributed by CMS Hasche Sigle


In October 2011 the Stuttgart Public Prosecutor's Office filed an indictment against Volkswagen (VW) employees in connection with T-Systems' sponsorship of the VfL Wolfsburg football club. This has triggered ripples of concern. Employees of carmaker VW, which is the largest employer in Wolfsburg, allegedly refused to extend the contract with T-Systems – VW's telecommunications provider – unless T-Systems also agreed to continue sponsorship of the town's premier league football club. The Stuttgart Public Prosecutor's Office regards this as bribery of employees of a business, which is an offence under Section 299 of the Criminal Code. This raises the question: what are the wider legal implications of company sponsorship?
Under Section 299 of the Criminal Code, it is a criminal offence to demand, allow oneself to be promised or accept a benefit for oneself or another in a business transaction in exchange for according unfair preference over another in the competitive purchase of goods or commercial services. Likewise, it is an offence to offer, promise or grant a benefit to an employee, agent of a business or third party in exchange for unfair preference in the purchase of goods. In the VW case and similar cases, there are two primary questions to be answered, which – if the answer to both is no – will lead to criminal liability.
The first is whether the sponsorship agreement is part of legitimate business deal. In principle, the law does not prohibit two companies from entering into a single agreement for two or more products or services that are not directly linked, and which provides for one of the parties to render sponsorship services in favour of the other party or a third party. This was the outcome of a Federal Court of Justice case of May 26 2011(1), in which a photographic company had granted benefits to a school in connection with a contract for taking photographs of pupils and classes and was charged with making bribes to people in public office.(2) The Federal Court of Justice ruled that to prohibit a person in public office from making any secondary consideration (vertragliche Nebenpflicht) in the context of a contract would be contrary to the protective purpose of the law (margin 21 of the judgment). The court argued that it is important to distinguish between the purchase of a service which – despite being set out in a contractual agreement – actually constitutes an act of bribery or unfair competition and the many cases in which public servants enter into legitimate civil law contracts in fulfilment of their duties. In making such a distinction, the relevant criterion would be whether the public servant acted legitimately under administrative law. If this principle is applied to relations between private individuals, which fall within the scope of Section 299 of the Criminal Code, the criterion will be whether it is legally admissible for sponsorship to be included in a reciprocal agreement. The civil law principle of the freedom of contract will generally mean that this is admissible. Ultimately, this means that including sponsorship activities in a reciprocal agreement will not normally be a problem if it is done in an open and transparent manner. It will not then constitute unfair preference in competition, because any potential contractual partner will also be able to offer sponsorship activities.
The second question is whether, assuming that sponsorship does not already form part of a legitimate business deal, it can be viewed as admissible 'cultivation of business relations'. If the sponsorship was in fact a concealed secondary service without which the agreement would not have come about, it goes beyond the admissible bounds of cultivating business relations and constitutes a criminal offence. German lawyers refer to this as an 'agreement contrary to law' (Unrechtsvereinbarung) which is deemed to exist when the benefit of the sponsorship is accorded to unfair preference in a competitive context. Whether this is the case depends on the specific circumstances. It may be difficult to argue that a particular sponsorship falls into the category of admissible cultivation of business relations if the sponsorship was actively made a condition for the deal and if the value of the sponsorship was not commensurate with the advertising value. The principle that companies rarely give free benefits to others must also be borne in mind. Another indication of unfair preference in a business context is if the sponsorship appears to serve no economic purpose for the sponsor.
Whether the sponsorship constitutes a criminal offence depends on its purpose. Unless a confession has been made, the law will try to ascertain the purpose on the basis of the accompanying circumstances. As in any case based on circumstantial evidence, there may well be an element of legal uncertainty. Companies would therefore be well advised to examine their sponsorship agreements closely to minimise any risk of criminal liability.


Endnotes
(1) Case 3 StR 492/10.
(2) Sections 331 and following of the Criminal Code.

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act convictions vacated due to prosecutorial misconduct

 By Fulbright & Jaworski LLP

On December 1 2011 US District Court Judge A Howard Matz vacated the conviction of and dismissed the indictment against Lindsey Manufacturing Company (LMC) and two individual co-defendants, Keith E Lindsey and Steve K Lee, because of prosecutorial misconduct. Informally referred to as the Lindsey case,(1) it was the first since the enactment of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in which a corporate defendant was tried and convicted for violations of the act.(2) In dismissing the indictment with prejudice, the judge harshly criticised the prosecution team for having made so many varied "mistakes" over a lengthy period between 2008 and 2011 that "they add up to an unusual and extreme picture of a prosecution gone badly awry".(3)
The judge detailed in his order what he found to be prosecutorial transgressions that were sufficiently serious to warrant dismissal with prejudice. In taking such action, the judge distinguished his criticism of the prosecution team by pointing out that:
"In this Court's experience, almost all of the prosecutors in the Office of the United States Attorney for this district consistently display admirable professionalism, integrity and fairness."(4)
The Department of Justice has filed a notice of appeal in the case.

Background
Following a five-week trial, on May 10 2011 the defendants were each convicted on one count of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and five counts of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations. The jury deliberated for one day before returning its verdict. The defendants were charged with having bribed two high-ranking officials of Mexico's state-owned utility company, Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), to obtain contracts for LMC. Specifically, the defendants were charged with having used a Mexican national named Enrique Aguilar(5) and his company Grupo International de Asesores SA to funnel the alleged bribes to the CFE officials.
The case was closely watched and is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the first Foreign Corrupt Practices Act case in recent history in which a corporate defendant had chosen to litigate the government's charges to verdict. Secondly, several seminal issues were addressed, including the government's broad interpretation of 'foreign official' and 'instrumentality' under the act. The judge ruled against the defendants on those issues, signalling a judicial willingness to side with the government in its aggressive stance on substantive interpretation of the act. Thirdly, the case was heavily litigated by both sides, with the defendants having brought complaints of what they claimed to be prosecutorial misconduct to the court's attention on several occasions before, during and after trial. Before the ruling, while the judge had shown concern during trial with certain actions taken by the government, he noted in his order that he had given the prosecution team significant leeway, citing strong judicial reluctance to find intentional prosecutorial misconduct.(6) Lastly, despite the cited reluctance, the judge ultimately and "with deep regret" found in this case that the prosecution "was marred by" a wide "range of misconduct" and therefore threw out the convictions of the defendants.(7) The court also cited its own failure during the fast-paced – and at many times acrimonious – trial in failing to see "the proverbial forest for the trees", stating that "it was difficult to step back and look into whether what was going on reflected not isolated acts but a pattern of invidious conduct".(8)
The order stated that several instances of misconduct on the part of the government "undoubtedly affected the verdicts and thus substantially prejudiced the Lindsey Defendants".(9)


Findings of pre-indictment misconduct

False and misleading warrant affidavits
The judge found that an affidavit executed in order to obtain a search warrant for LMC's business premises contained false statements. Specifically, the court found that in more than one place the affidavit stated that LMC had made payments to another Aguilar-controlled company when that was not the case.(10) The judge held a pre-trial hearing on the matter under Franks v Delaware (438 US 154 (1978)) to address the false statements and determine whether the warrant should be voided. At that hearing, according to the order, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent who executed the final affidavit disclosed that one of the prosecutors had inserted the false statements into the agent's final executed affidavit without the agent's knowledge.(11) The judge ultimately ordered production of all 14 drafts of the affidavit, after which it was revealed that the first 12 drafts did not contain the false statements. Nevertheless, at the Franks hearing on the affidavit the judge found probable cause without the false statements and declined to void the search warrant.(12) In recounting the various acts of what the court now found to have been misconduct, the order also noted that the false language at issue was contained in five other affidavits executed after the first affidavit, and had been used to support search or seizure warrants in the case.
The judge also noted that the first search warrant affidavit was additionally misleading in what it did not contain. He explained that during the Franks hearing on the first affidavit, the government also disclosed for the first time that the affidavit had failed to include the fact that approximately $430,000 in the Grupo account used to fund the alleged bribes to the CFE officials came from someone other than LMC. The order indicates that it was this information that led the court to require the prosecution to produce all drafts of the affidavit.


Warrantless search of LMC buildings
The judge noted that FBI agents compounded the harm caused by the first affidavit containing the false information by searching not only the LMC building covered by the warrant, but also two LMC buildings that were not covered by the warrant.


Purposeful insertion of improper language in search warrant
The order also revealed that the FBI improperly reviewed electronically stored information found on seized LMC computers as a result of improper language in the search warrant. According to the judge, the language authorised the case agents – instead of a "filter" team – to review the electronically stored information. The court noted that it had previously found the error to be attributed to "clumsy drafting, not bad faith". However, in the order, the judge stated that although he still found:
"that this violation was not invidious . . . the improper language . . . was not present in 11 of the 14 versions of the warrant, thereby permitting the inference that the Government purposely inserted it in the final version."(13)

Grand jury testimony of FBI agent
The judge was particularly troubled by the grand jury testimony of one of the FBI agents, who testified before the grand jury four times in order to obtain the indictment against the defendants. The order addressed six instances of what the court held amounted to false or misleading testimony(14):
  • During two of the agent's grand jury appearances, the prosecutors displayed a chart connecting in an unbroken line both LMC and a company from another Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigation to both Sorvill, the alleged intermediary in the other investigation, and Grupo. The court found that by doing so, the agent's testimony "suggest[ed] a non-existent link between LMC and Sorvill" and was similar to the false statements regarding Sorvill that were contained in the first search warrant affidavit.(15)
  • Regarding a July 3 2006 contract between LMC and Grupo, the agent testified that the contract was created and executed in response to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit which questioned the payment of 30% commissions to Grupo. The judge corrected the record, saying that "In fact, LMC had no notice of any audit when that contract was executed, and the IRS audit that LMC did learn about later on did not relate to tax year 2006 or to commissions".(16)
  • Before the grand jury testimony, the agent had received copies of several contracts totalling $8 million that LMC had entered into with CFE before retaining Aguilar. The contracts were either in English or translated into English. In response to a grand juror's question as to whether Lindsey had a history of winning CFE contracts, the agent nevertheless testified that LMC did not have much business with CFE before Aguilar became LMC's sales representative.
  • The agent testified that in response to FBI questioning conducted when the search warrants for the LMC premises were executed, Lee said that he "[d]idn't want to know. Just didn't want to know" what the 30% commission (to Grupo) was going to be used for.(17) The judge noted that:
    • the agent was not present at the interview of Lee;
    • the FBI's memorandum of that interview contained no such statement; and
    • the prosecutors acknowledged that Lee never made such a statement.
  • The agent testified to the grand jury that in response to an IRS audit, Lee told LMC's bookkeeper to reclassify the Grupo commissions before turning documents over to LMC's accountant. The conversation between Lee and the accountant was in fact not related to an audit and, with one possible exception, the commissions were not reclassified.
  • In response to a question from a grand juror, the agent testified that as much as 90% to 95% of the funds in the Grupo account came from LMC. However, in an earlier affidavit, the agent had accurately stated that LMC's deposits into Grupo's account totalled only approximately 70% of the funds. The judge noted that the "material difference between these sworn statements is something even [the FBI] acknowledged at trial".(18)
The judge made special note of the testimony discussed in these last four points; all were given during the agent's final appearance before the grand jury on October 21 2010, the day on which the indictment was returned against the defendants. The judge found that each was "indisputably material", having been reflected in the government's theories of the case before the grand jury and at trial. The judge also pointed out that some of that testimony was a direct response to questioning from the grand jury.(19)
Finally, the order cited potentially exculpatory omissions in the agent's grand jury testimony. Although the prosecution correctly argued – and the judge acknowledged – that the government was not obligated to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, the order stated that:
"While viewed in a vacuum, the Government…is correct…the omissions are not irrelevant because [the standard to be applied for the dismissal motion] is whether, in its totality the Government's conduct was so improper and harmful to the Defendants as to have violated their rights, undermined the very foundations of judicial integrity, or otherwise been so egregious as to require a deterrent sanction."(20)

Findings of post-indictment misconduct


Failure to produce agent's grand jury testimony
In discussing what he considered to be additional misconduct following the indictment, the judge acknowledged that the agent's numerous errors in the grand jury testimony did not establish that perjury was knowingly committed. The court speculated instead that "perhaps [the agent] was sloppy, or lazy, or ill-prepared by the prosecutive team", and concluded that the prosecution had determined that the agent would be a poor witness and "that its investigation was terribly flawed".(21) The judge further concluded and cited the prosecution's acknowledgement that it wanted to keep the agent from testifying in order to avoid questions about the investigation.
Thus, under established principles, if the agent did not testify at trial, the defendants would not be entitled to see transcripts of her grand jury testimony unless they contained exculpatory material. However, the judge revealed that he had ordered the agent to testify in a hearing on one of the defendants' motion to suppress a statement that he was alleged to have made during the search of the LMC premises. Following that hearing, "in light of several major problems that had surfaced in the suppression hearing testimony" and upon the defendants' motion for production of all transcripts of the agent's testimony, the court inspected the grand jury testimony transcripts in private and then ordered that the prosecution produce all transcripts of the agent's grand jury testimony to the defendants.(22)
After having been admonished by the court on several occasions for failing to meet discovery obligations, discussed in the order, the prosecution represented on April 7 2011 that it had conducted "a top to bottom review of discovery" and that "[w]e have done what we believe not only meets our obligation but exceeds it".(23) At the time of the representation, none of the agent's grand jury testimony had been produced to the defendants; nor were any produced until eight days later and 10 days after opening statements had been given at trial. In the course of the post-verdict motion to dismiss activity, the prosecution disclosed that it had not turned over the transcript from the agent's October 14 2010 testimony.


Angela Aguilar's privileged communications
According to the order, Angela Aguilar was in custody through the conclusion of the trial. The judge had granted to a "filter" team the assistant US attorney's ex parte application filed on January 28 2011 to permit the prosecution to obtain telephone conversations recorded by the Bureau of Prisons between Angela and Enrique Aguilar. Later, the prosecutors disclosed that as early as December 9 2010, the lead prosecutor had obtained from the bureau not only the phone conversations that were the subject of the ex parte application, but also copies of Angela Aguilar's emails, some of which included communications between Angela Aguilar and her attorneys. According to the order, the prosecutors neither sought nor obtained the court's permission to receive these emails and misrepresented how they had obtained them.(24)


Testimony regarding another case
According to the judge, the prosecutors improperly elicited testimony from a witness who pleaded guilty in a different case that involved bribery of CFE officials. Even after a limiting instruction from the judge, the prosecutors used this testimony in closing argument. Although the judge had overruled an objection at the time, in dismissing the case the judge stated:
"in retrospect, [the Court] should not have [overruled the objection]. . . . The suggestion that Lee and other LMC witnesses had any connection to [the prosecution's witness] or ever even knew anything about him was not only misleading, but contrary to the Court's ruling."(25)


'Wilful blindness' closing argument
Before closing arguments at trial, the judge had rejected prosecutorial requests to give the jury stand-alone instructions regarding 'deliberate ignorance' or 'wilful blindness'. Despite this, during closing arguments, prosecutors stated that "the law is saying you can't turn a blind eye".(26) The judge sustained an objection to this statement, but the prosecutor then told the jury that the defendants "cannot see all of this smoke and all of these red flags and then close their eyes", and covered his eyes with his hands.(27) In the order, the judge carefully pointed out that the prosecutor at fault "was not directly or personally responsible for the numerous other forms of misconduct", and that his actions could have been "entirely unintentional".(28) Nevertheless, the judge found that:
"Now that the Court has had the benefit of appraising . . . in light of the supplemental briefing [on the Motion to Dismiss] . . . the Court finds that this improper argument undoubtedly resonated with at least some of the weary jurors."(29)

Comment
The judge made it clear that he was displeased by many of the actions of the prosecutors in this case, saying that "The prosecutor's job isn't just to win, but to win fairly, staying well within the rules".(30) It is therefore tempting to interpret this case as a judicial attempt to curtail the aggressive enforcement strategies employed by the government in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigations over the past several years, but it is not clear whether the case will have such a pervasive impact.
Despite the ultimate dismissal and harsh words of the court in its order, during the trial the judge ruled in the prosecution's favour on many motions, including eight previous motions to dismiss the indictment. Of those previous motions to dismiss, at least five were premised upon claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Equally important, the judge ruled against the defendants on substantive motions challenging the government's broad interpretation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
It is probable that the judge's rebuke to the prosecution team and resulting dismissal will instil caution in the government when determining whether to seek indictment in the first instance and how it proceeds if it chooses to do so. For example, a factor that the court appeared to consider in dismissing the indictment against the defendants is that, in the court's estimation, "[t]he case against the Lindsey Defendants was far from compelling".(31) However, the judge included in his order that the defendants were not entitled to a finding of factual innocence. He also pointed out the financial and emotional toll exacted on the defendants and stated clearly throughout his order that "dismissing an indictment is a disfavored remedy".(32)
While the case is certainly a defeat for the government, and the second such defeat this year,(33) companies and individuals can take limited comfort from the Lindsey case. As Charles E DuRoss, the Department of Justice's deputy chief of the Fraud Section, stated in November of 2011, the Department of Justice "will continue to follow evidence and bring [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] charges when we think appropriate".(34) Although this statement – similar to others made in recent years by Department of Justice officials – was made before the Lindsey dismissal, there is little reason to anticipate substantial government retrenchment from its aggressive posture on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
More Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cases can be expected to go to trial, and therefore more wins for both defendants and the prosecution. The Lindsey case demonstrates that defendants can and should strenuously challenge the government when appropriate to do so. However, defendants have yet to achieve a trial ruling, much less a verdict, that significantly curbs the government's broad reading and application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the past decade. Companies and individuals should continue to implement risk-based compliance programmes designed to prevent or detect corruption issues in the first instance, rather than finding themselves in the position of challenging the government at trial.


Endnotes
(1) US v Noriega, US District Court, Central District of California, Western Division of Los Angeles, Case 2:10- cr- 10131-AHM-4.
(2) For further details please see "Jury convicts first corporate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act defendant".
(3) Lindsey case, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, at 5.
(4) Id.
(5) Aguilar and his wife Angela Aguilar were also indicted as co-defendants in the case. Aguilar has not been arrested. Angela Aguilar was arrested and defended against a count of conspiracy to commit money laundering at trial. She was convicted, entered into a 'time served' settlement with the prosecution and has returned to Mexico.
(6) Order, at 1-2.
(7) Order, at 2, 28.
(8) Order, at 5.
(9) Order, at 36.
(10) A company also allegedly controlled by Aguilar by the name of Sorvill was the purported conduit for bribes in another Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigation by the Department of Justice in which one of the Lindsey case prosecutors was involved. The judge noted that "the prosecutors pushed aggressively to link Sorvill to the Lindsey Defendants, when in fact there was no evidence even suggesting the Lindsey Defendants ever heard of Sorvill". Order, at 3.
(11) At the hearing, the assistant US attorney responsible for insertion of the false statements said that there had been a misunderstanding and that when he asked the agent to identify any errors in his changes, the agent had not identified the statements that the court found to be false. Order, at 9.
(12) The prosecution's attempt at the post-verdict dismissal stage to rely on the court's earlier Franks motion denial was rebuked by the judge, who held that "The issue at this point is … not whether there was sufficient, non-tainted cause to obtain a warrant, but whether the Government's submission to a … judge of an affidavit containing a material falsehood was part of an overall course of conduct that requires the sanction of dismissal". Order, at 9.
(13) Order, at 10.
(14) Order, at 11-12.
(15) Id, at 11.
(16) Id, at 11
(17) Id, at 12, citing the transcript of the grand jury testimony from October 21 2010 at page 22.
(18) Id, at 12.
(19) Order, at 12.
(20) These omissions, described by the defendants as "an effort to conceal important and exculpatory information", included that:
  • Hurricane Wilma hit Mexico in July 2006, causing CFE to obtain immediately emergency restoration systems, and the first significant post-Aguilar contract between LMC and CFE was signed shortly thereafter;
  • the IRS audit found no irregularities in LMC's payments to Grupo and no taxes owing; and
  • a source other than LMC had deposited $433,000 into Grupo's account. Order, at 13 n12.
(21) Order, at 13-14
(22) Order, at 15.
(23) Order, at 16 citing the Court's Docket 642, page 47.
(24) The judge found that the prosecutors' actions directly affecting only Angela Aguilar were nevertheless relevant to the dismissal motion because:
  • the "broad legal principle" underlying all grounds for dismissal based on misconduct is that "the prosecution has the duty to comply with its legal obligations in every case"; and
  • the defendants were accused of conspiring with Aguilar, and both Aguilars were accused of conspiring with each other. Order, at 18.
(25) Id, at 21.
(26) Id, at 22.
(27) Id, at 22.
(28) Id.
(29) Id, at 23.
(30) Order, at 29, citing US v Kojayan, 8 F 3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir 1993).
(31) Order, at 37.
(32) Order, at 38, citing US v Rogers, 751 F 2d 1074, 1076-77 (9th Cir 1985).
(33) Earlier this year a mistrial was declared in the prosecution of the first four "Shot Show" defendants. See Transcript of Trial Record, US v Patel, 09-cr-00335 (DDC July 7 2011).
(34) American Conference Institute, 26th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, November 8 2011.