Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Key advantages in procurement bids: can labour factors tip the scale?



The provision of goods and services to public authorities is a lucrative but competitive activity. In Mexico, knowledge of the intricacies of applicable legislation may give bidders a competitive advantage that helps them to prepare a winning bid. Labour aspects are often overlooked during the bidding process, but they play a key role in government procurement processes and may even decide the outcome. Several Mexican laws and regulations indicate labour-related criteria for the award of particular types of contract.
Precedence for hiring certain employees
The Law on Public Sector Acquisition, Leases and Performance of Services and its regulations provide that, all other factors being equal, the government may give precedence to a bidder that employs a higher proportion of Mexican nationals. These provisions are in line with the Federal Labour Law, which imposes a general requirement on all companies in Mexico to have a minimum of 90% Mexican nationals among their workforces, with exceptions for technicians, management personnel and certain other skilled employees.
Evaluating the importance of labour factors
The public sector acquisition legislation provides that government institutions must organise tenders according to so-called 'points and percentages' criteria, whereby the elements of each bid can be assigned a point or percentage value. These weighted elements may include job creation alongside factors such as price, quality, financing methods, energy efficiency, responsible use of water supplies, optimisation and sustainable use of resources and environmental protection. Similarly, the Public Works and Related Services Law and its regulations establish that government entities must prefer bidders that employ a higher proportion of Mexican nationals and disabled employees; additional points or percentages will be awarded accordingly.
On September 9 2010 the Ministry of Public Administration issued guidelines for public acquisitions, leases and services, public works and related services. They describe the distribution of points and percentages in tender processes. Bidders must provide properly documented information on the personnel used in projects over the preceding 10 years. In the assessment of a bid proposal, points or percentages will be awarded to reflect the professionals and technicians in the organisational structure; the inclusion of employment contracts that clearly describe the technical and professional qualifications of the employees involved will make a proposal more robust. Bidders are also required to demonstrate their experience in prior work or projects with similar characteristics and to demonstrate the skills and competencies of their personnel. For example, points will be awarded for proficiency in the use of certain tools and machinery, and a well-prepared bidder will be able to submit certification of its employees' training and skills programmes.
Service contracts and other requirements
Certain tender structures will require compliance with additional labour-related requirements. For example, when the tender calls for one entity to hire the necessary personnel and another entity to provide the machinery, equipment or technology, both entities will require an inter-company service agreement. Many government entities require that service providers have a collective bargaining agreement in place with the union that represents the workforce of the government entity. In other cases, the application of the government entity's collective bargaining agreement to the service provider may be a requirement of the bid. Compliance with such requirements must be considered and evaluated as part of the bidder's preparations.
Comment
A properly drafted bid for a government procurement project cannot overlook employment and labour matters. The composition, skills and other elements of a company's workforce are a strategic part of its proposal and should be carefully considered when participating in a tender process. Documenting particular characteristics of the workforce (eg, nationality, disability and experience) will help to achieve the highest point or percentage score. Particular labour law requirements, such as the existence of service agreements, may arise in particular tender processes. In a competitive environment, attention to such details can make the difference between winning and losing a contract.
For further information on this topic please contact Alfredo Kupfer-Dominguez at Sanchez-DeVanny Eseverri SC's Mexico City office by telephone (+52 55 5029 8500), fax (+52 55 5029 8501) or email (akupfer@sanchezdevanny.com). Alternatively, contact David Puente-Tostado at Sanchez-DeVanny Eseverri SC's Monterrey office by telephone (+52 81 8153 3900), fax (+52 81 8153 3901) or email (dpt@sanchezdevanny.com).

New public procurement regime introduced

Introduction
On February 16 2012 a new law was published in the Federal Law Gazette (2012/10 I). The law comprises:
  • the Federal Act on the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Contracts in the Fields of Defence and Security (also known as the Defence Procurement Act) (Article 1 of the law); and
  • the 2012 Amendment to the Federal Public Procurement Act (Article 2 of the law).
The Defence Procurement Act, as well as major parts of the Amendment to the Federal Public Procurement Act, will enter into force on April 1 2012.
Defence Procurement Act
Implementation of EU Defence and Security Directive
The Defence Procurement Act implements the EU Defence and Security Directive (2009/81/EC). This implementation follows some delay, since the directive was expected to have been transposed into national law by August 21 2011.
Scope
The act follows the model of the Procurement Act, but is a separate law that is lex specialis (ie, special law) to the general rules of the Procurement Act. Subject to Articles 30, 45, 46, 55 and 296 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (awards under these articles do not fall within the scope of the Defence Procurement Act or the Procurement Act, but are subject only to the fundamental freedoms of the treaty), the Defence Procurement Act applies to contracts awarded in the field of defence and security for:
  • the supply of military equipment, including any parts, components and/or subassemblies thereof;
  • the supply of sensitive equipment, including any parts, components and/or subassemblies thereof;
  • works, supplies and services that are directly related to military or sensitive equipment;
  • works and services for specifically military purposes; and
  • sensitive works and sensitive services.
The Defence Procurement Act covers the above contracts regardless of the amount of the award. The contracting authority can freely choose between:
  • the restricted procedure with prior publication of a contract notice; and
  • the negotiated procedure with prior publication of a contract notice.
Relaxed regime below certain thresholds
Below the threshold of €75,000, contracts can be directly awarded with publication of a contract notice and without tender proceedings involving more than one tenderer. Furthermore, below the threshold of €500,000 for works contracts and €200,000 for supply and service contracts, a direct award with prior publication of a contract notice is admissible. With respect to awards below the thresholds of €387,000 for supply and service contracts and €4.845 million for works contracts, a public procurement regime-'lite' applies, which gives the contracting authority greater discretion in line with the regime of non-priority services under the Procurement Act (and EU Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC), provided that the tender procedures follow the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination and grant sufficient transparency.
Specific rules for security of information and security of supply
Since the Defence Procurement Act relates to the award of contracts in the field of defence and security, the law contains specific rules for measures and requirements necessary to ensure the security of such information at the requisite level. To this end, the contracting authority may, among other things, require that the tender comprise a commitment of the tenderer and the subcontractors to safeguard appropriately the confidentiality of all classified information. With regard to the security of supply, the contracting authority may in particular require that any tenderer provide certification and documentation demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the contracting authority, that the tenderer will be able to honour its obligations regarding the export and transfer of goods associated with the contract.
Rules to be applied to review proceedings
In respect of remedies, the act declares that the regulations regarding review proceedings of the Procurement Act are also applicable for the review of awards of contracts in the field of defence and security. The same applies to confirmation proceedings after the award. In addition, the Defence Procurement Act provides for certain organisational rules with respect to classified information.
Amendment to Federal Public Procurement Act
New direct award procedure 
The amendment introduces the new award procedure of "direct award with prior publication of a contract notice" below the thresholds of €500,000 for works contracts and €130,000 for supply and service contracts. Below these two new thresholds, public contracts can be directly awarded with prior publication of a contract notice. This means that the respective contracting authority must publish a contract notice (at least on a national level), pursuant to which interested economic operators can submit an application to participate in the direct award. Such companies must be selected pursuant to objective, non-discriminatory selection criteria that relate to the planned award.
Furthermore, the amendment reduces the current threshold for direct awards from €100,000 to €50,000. Consequently, award procedures that are initiated before April 1 2012 can still benefit from the higher direct award threshold of €100,000.
The Procurement Act applies not only to awards above the thresholds of EU Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, but in principle to all types of awards of public supply, service and works contracts.
Greater transparency for award decisions
Similar to other types of contract, such as works, delivery and priority services contract, the amendment introduces a requirement for non-priority services that the communication of the award decision contain a summary of the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender selected, the name of the successful tenderer and the award sum.
For further information on this topic please contact Bernhard Müller at DORDA BRUGGER JORDIS Rechtsanwälte GmbH by telephone (+43 1 533 4795), fax (+43 1 533 4797) or email (bernhard.mueller@dbj.at).

New law provides first regulation of public-private partnerships

In an effort to foster private investment in large-scale infrastructure projects, which are much needed in Colombia, Law 1508/2012 has been passed to regulate public-private partnerships (PPPs). The law applies to all contracts whereby state-owned entities assign to a private investor the right to design and build an infrastructure project and its related services, or to carry out the construction, repair, improvement or conditioning of such a project.

Pursuant to the new law, the private investor will enjoy the right to the economic exploitation of such infrastructure or services according to the conditions agreed with the state-owned entity. The selection process for this purpose and the rules for entering into and carrying out such PPPs will be governed by the public procurement statute, which comprises Law 80/1993, Law 1150/2007 and Decree 734/2012.
A PPP shall have a maximum term of 30 years, including any term extensions. The government budget for such projects may not exceed 20% of the estimated budget for the corresponding investment project.
The following principles apply to PPPs:
  • A PPP may derive from either a public or private initiative.
  • If the initiative does not result in a PPP, the studies presented will continue to be the property of their originator. However, the state shall have the right to acquire any study or information that it may deem pertinent.
  • All resources derived from the PPP must be managed through a trust, regardless of whether they are of a public or private nature.
  • For a PPP to be considered, it must be worth more than 6,000 times the minimum legal wage – for 2012, this is equivalent to Ps3.4 billion (approximately $1.89 million).
  • Local governments shall prepare and maintain up-to-date technical inventories of projects to be developed in the short, medium and long term. Private parties may, at their sole discretion and risk, invest in studies and designs for such projects.

Contributed by Peña Mancero

Friday, June 1, 2012

A Dilemma in Public Procurement Governance: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago


Over the last quarter century, a global revolution of sorts has taken place in the appreciation of the function of procurement within the public sector.  No longer viewed as a transactional, back office function, the highly strategic impact of procurement decision-making on the sustainable growth and development of countries and regional trading blocks is being increasingly recognized.  As well, given the specific vulnerability of the function to misuse, heightened public awareness has placed accountability in public sector procurement in focus in almost every jurisdiction worldwide.

The impetus for the advancement of public procurement reform initiatives in developing states is escalating as trade liberalisation is exhorted as a universal good.   In addition to the mounting external pressures from the globalised economic environment on developing states, the demands for more accountable governance from an expanding enlightened citizenry and strengthened civil society and media are causing an increasingly difficult to ignore internal pressure for public procurement reform.

Public Procurement reformative efforts within CARICOM member states are presently plagued by tensions between the varied and oft-times competing objectives of the political desire to retain “policy space” in order to pursue socio-economic development objectives and the demands of trade liberalization and accountable governance.  Further, the existence of deeply entrenched commercial, bureaucratic and political interests have perennially stymied the will of successive CARICOM regimes to grapple with the challenge of effective public procurement reform. 

The public procurement system in Trinidad and Tobago engages all of these pressures and is largely representative of the systems, existing in some CARICOM Member States also former British colonies, which have not yet undertaken comprehensive legislative reform.  The system characterized by the interaction of a multiplicity of disparate legal texts is in dire need of reform in the form of a modern, comprehensive statutory framework with clear hierarchical structures. The existing framework is out-dated and has not kept pace with the Government’s multi-billion dollar development agenda resulting in a systematic policy being undertaken to engage in public contracting outside of the existing framework through the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector.

This limited coverage is however not the only weakness in the existing framework. Other weaknesses include absence of a regulatory body having oversight over the procurement function; absence of a formal, independent complaints and/or dispute resolution mechanism; absence of a centralized electronic public procurement information system; inadequate procurement reporting and collection of statistics and data; absence of whistleblowing protection systems and forensic skills and ongoing training and capacity challenges. 

Over the last decade, the absence of a comprehensive regulatory framework in Trinidad and Tobago has resulted in extremely weak procurement governance, burgeoning allegations of political corruption in public expenditure and an erosion of public confidence in the state.  This is evidenced by the spate of general elections held between 2000-2010 arguably catalyzed by the heightened public concern and erosion of public confidence in public sector spending activities, as reported in the country’s media.  Attempts at reform have been reactionary and piecemeal at best and after two major public procurement enquiries (Piarco 2003-2004) and (Uff 2009-2010) to the chagrin of many citizens comprehensive reform is yet to materialize.

Background to the Current Public Procurement Governance Dilemma
During the early independence years an aggressive development agenda engendered an escalation in public sector construction activity placing strain on the existing public sector financial management systems.  A lack of uniformity in policy, standards and practices, and instances of insufficient security and poor management were identified. By 1961, rationalization was attempted through the passage of the Central Tenders Board Ordinance (CTBO).

The CTBO, established a centralized system and the Central Tenders Board (CTB) as “the sole and exclusive authority” for procuring public sector goods, works and services. The principles of transparency, accountability and efficiency underpinned the new regulatory framework through which articles, works and services were delivered to the public using public funds.

As the Government’s development agenda continued to expand, the need to participate more directly in the public procurement process was recognized and a policy decision was taken to amend the CTBO in 1979 to allow the Government to contract on its own behalf. Following up on this amendment, new statutory corporations were established with their own contracting capability outside the purview of the CTB and several pre-existing statutory bodies were removed from the purview as well.

Statutory erosion of the remit of the CTB persisted by amendments to the CTBO in 1987, 1991 and 1993 resulting in the vast majority of public procurement in through the SOE sector being administered outside of the statutory framework.

Additionally, over the last thirty years the practice of creating new hybrid bodies termed “Special Purpose Companies” (SPCs) developed.  These are wholly owned state companies incorporated as private limited liability companies under the Companies Act 1995 as amended in 1997.  The SPCs were supposed to provide expert personnel to speed up project implementation. Though the Ministry of Finance issued guidelines for the SOE sector (including the SPCs) to follow, evidence provided at the 2010 Uff Commission of Enquiry into the Construction Sector and UDeCOTT demonstrated substantial non-compliance on the part of these entities and limited enforcement by Central Government.

The political justification proffered for the exclusion of these bodies from the CTBO regime had primarily been that the bureaucratic CTBO procedures hampered commercial efficiency and the pace of the Government’s infrastructural development agenda.

The governance dilemma represented by the current state of affairs is that: while on the one hand SPCs are owned by the State, utilizing public funds and operating on behalf of the Government, they are not, at the same time, subject to the same regulatory and accountability frameworks as other public bodies. In decentralizing the public contracting function, there was no concomitant overarching regulatory interface established, governing the relationship between the State and these bodies, and in particular, their engagement with public contracting activities. 

CTBO Weaknesses
That is not to say that the centralized system under the CTBO provides an adequate regulatory framework to meet the requirements of modern public sector procurement realities.  The weaknesses of the CTBO system have been documented comprehensively in the White Paper on Reform of the Public Sector Procurement Regime 2005 and other papers and there is little need to repeat them in detail herein as they are non-controversial and are widely recognised.  

The weaknesses include, the lack of a formal complaints and/or dispute resolution mechanism for disgruntled bidders; the lack of a regulatory body with power to investigate and monitor independent of the CTB; the narrow legislative focus only on the tendering phase of the procurement cycle with little guidance on budgeting, feasibility and contract management; the lack of technical infrastructure and development of an electronic centralized public information system; lengthy and costly bureaucratic procedures which are unable to keep pace with the expanding needs of Government’s development agenda; the absence of provision for newer procurement methodologies including eAuctions and innovative project financing models such as Public Private Partnerships; poor data collection and reporting and; human resource limitations in the form of a dearth of trained staff at the CTB.

All of the above notwithstanding, it is notable that no significant allegation of corruption has been levied in relation to CTB awarded contracts from the date of its establishment to present. However, the inference to be drawn from this is unclear and may be reflective of the nature and scale of public contracts let under the auspices of the CTB, as compared with other public entities.

Weaknesses in the SOE Sector
Entities in the SOE sector procure utilizing their own tender rules and procedures.  It should be noted that there is no uniform or standard process or procedure for all such bodies and there are varying levels of oversight depending on whether the body was created by statute or incorporated as a limited liability company under the Companies Act.

The procurement governance risks in the SOE sector are significant and are facilitated by the lack of an overarching regulatory framework for all public bodies and special purpose companies; the lack of a formal complaints and/or dispute resolution system; the lack of uniformity of rules, procedures and documentation; poor management; and a lack of transparency.   Although the flexibility of the systems allows for the Government to escalate its infrastructural development programmes, the present perceived vulnerability to corruption and associated risks and the consequential strain on value for money objectives remain significant.

Reform Initiatives – The Last Decade 2002-2012
Despite several attempts by the State to rationalize procurement activities in the SOE sector including: the 2005 standard procurement guidelines issued by the Finance Ministry; the White Paper on Reform of the Public Sector Procurement Regime 2005 which proposed a principle model for procurement reform based on the principles of Transparency, Accountability and Value for Money, and a 2008 SOE Performance Monitoring Manual relating to governance, reporting lines and mechanisms, auditing and performance indicators, there has been limited success in stemming the perception of endemic corruption in the public sector.

Increasing public disquiet as a result of Government inaction in enacting the much touted public accountability statutory framework led to the establishment of the Uff Enquiry in 2009 which report was laid in Parliament in April 2010.  The report confirmed public concerns about the lack of oversight and transparency of the contracting practices and made 91 recommendations (inclusive of criminal investigations of some public officials) for reform.  After a snap election in May 2010 and a new Government coming into power championing the anti-corruption agenda, promised the implementation of the recommendations and comprehensive statutory procurement reform.

In fulfillment of this promise The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Property Bill 2010 along with the National Tenders Board Bill 1997 was laid in parliament but since 2010 has been before a Joint Select Parliamentary Committee with no discernible output to date. 

A Way Forward: Beyond Statutory Regulation?
To date, despite the current well-publicised governance gaps and loss of public confidence in public sector procurement there is yet to be any change in the public procurement regulatory landscape.  This coupled with regional initiatives to harmonize public procurement laws and the signing of trade treaties like the CARIFORUM EC EPA impacting public procurement activities suggests a governance lacuna that must surely be filled.

This notwithstanding, in recent times, quite paradoxically and perhaps arguably as a result of the increasing disquiet and seeming lack of political will, some of the most innovative initiatives in public procurement reform in the region aimed at more efficient and accountable public sector procurement outside of a regulatory framework has found its genesis in Trinidad and Tobago including (i) the establishment of a regional procurement professional association and institution seeking to build professional capacity and ethical maturity in the implementation of the function of procurement (ii) the increase in specialised training, conferencing and capacity building interventions (iii) the adoption with Government support of emergent technological innovations in the form of reverse eAuctions and eBusiness applications (iv) the development of Corporate Ethics Codes and Practices in several public sector companies including the introduction of secure anonymous & confidential reporting hotlines for employees, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders to report ethical and other breaches. 

In particular, the adoption of whistleblowing systems in some state-owned bodies has been a welcome development as research demonstrates this as one of the most effective anti-corruption mechanisms developed to date.  

These initiatives are bottom up initiatives emanating from the citizens both individual and corporate seeking to tackle the challenge of more efficient and accountable procurement head on.  Despite the considerable perturbation at the persistent regulatory lacuna, the lack of statutory regulation has seemed to catalyze these organic initiatives aimed at transforming the professional and organizational cultures with some success. 

In 2012, the Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago (PETROTRIN) won one of five prizes in the global Procurement Innovation Challenge hosted by the World Bank for using ICT to improve effectiveness, increase transparency, reduce costs and save trees.  In a groundbreaking initiative led by Chartered Accountant and Contracts Coordinator Mr. Steven Samlalsingh, instead of being placed on the map as a developing country with the characteristic weak procurement systems plagued by endemic corrupt activity, Trinidad and Tobago was placed on the map as a world leader in procurement innovation.

What this success demonstrates is that the need for a transformation in the ethical, professional and organizational cultures must be recognized and bottom up strategies aimed at this should be encouraged.  Further, the need to build critical enforcement capacity in respect of the laws already in our books through the development of more sophisticated forensic methodologies in the investigation of white-collar crime and in particular procurement fraud is also critical. 

Perhaps herein lies the key to elevating the public procurement governance debate in Trinidad and Tobago. Persistent focus on statutory reform only by leading procurement reform advocates and organisations has ignored two critical factors. In order to achieve effective and accountable procurement, a statutory framework alone will not provide the solution and neither must it necessarily lead the way.